Abstract. Two-party Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) is a very useful cryptographic tool which allows two parties to evaluate a function known to both parties on their private (secret) inputs. Some applications with sophisticated privacy needs require the function to be known only to one party and kept private (hidden) from the other one. However, existing solutions for SFE of private functions (PF-SFE) deploy Universal Circuits (UC) and are still very inecient in practice. In this paper we bridge the gap between SFE and PF-SFE with SFE of what we call semi-private functions (SPF-SFE), i.e., one function out of a given class of functions is evaluated without revealing which one. We present a general framework for SPF-SFE allowing a ne-grained trade-o and tuning between SFE and PF-SFE covering both extremes. In our framework, semiprivate functions can be composed from several privately programmable blocks (PPB) which can be programmed with one function out of a class of functions. The framework allows ecient and secure embedding of constants into the resulting circuit to improve performance. To demonstrate practicability of the framework we have implemented a compiler for SPF-SFE based on the Fairplay SFE framework. SPF-SFE is sucient for many practically relevant privacy-preserving applications, such as privacy-preserving credit checking which can be implemented using our framework and compiler as described in the paper.
Introduction
Two-party Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) is an important and wide area of cryptographic research (see, e.g., [Yao86, LP04, MNPS04, AHL05, Kol05, LP07, KS08a, LPS08] ). It allows two parties to securely evaluate a common function on their private inputs without involving a trusted third party. The function is represented as a boolean circuit and evaluated based on a garbled version of the circuit which is created by one party (constructor Bob) and evaluated by the other party (evaluator Alice). Usually SFE hides the intermediate results but -as the function is known to both parties -not the structure (topology) of the function.
In practice, however, a variety of business models require privacy properties beyond the secrecy of parties' input data to additionally keep the evaluated function private. The underlying business motivations vary from commercial incentives (e.g., protection of intellectual property) to pure security requirements to reduce the probability of credential forgery or to make insider attacks obsolete. Typical use cases are client-server applications where a user Alice inputs her private data x (hidden to Bob), the server Bob inputs his private function f (hidden to Alice), and the protocol outputs f (x) to both parties such that neither
The second author was supported by the European Union under FP6 project SPEED. The third author was supported by the European Union under FP7 project CACE. party gain any information about the other party's input. Prominent examples are privacypreserving trust negotiation schemes [FAL04, FLA06, FAL06] (SPF) . Basically, these applications reect the following scenario: A user Alice has private data x, and a service provider Bob has a semi-private function f ∈ F as input, where F represents a given class of functions. At the end of the protocol, Alice obtains f (x) but not which specic f was evaluated and Bob obtains no information on x. This problem, called secure function evaluation of semi-private functions (SPF-SFE) , can be reduced to Yao's protocol where circuit's topology is revealed to the evaluator and only the functionality of the gates of the circuit is hidden. The evaluator sees the circuit topology but can only guess which functionality each part of the circuit might evaluate. We concentrate on relaxed-security model, i.e., security against malicious evaluator Alice and semi-honest (honest-but-curious) constructor Bob. This model is widely used in current cryptographic literature [NP99, AIR01, LL07] and well-justied in many practical applications where performance is crucial and constructor Bob can be assumed to behave semi-honestly by means of legal contracts or possible loss of reputation.
While SPF-SFE based on Yao's protocol has been proposed as building block in many applications (e.g., [FAL04, FAZ05, FLA06, FAL06 ,SS08]), we give the rst unied theory for SPF-SFE. Extending and improving previously known techniques we present a general theoretical framework for SPF-SFE together with a language and tools to specify and automatically generate SPF-SFE protocols for practical applications.
Related Work. The idea of constructing circuits for a special class of functions and evaluating them eciently with Yao's protocol in the relaxed-security model have been used in several sub-protocols [FAL04, FAZ05, FLA06, FAL06, KS08b, SS08] contains the high-level overview of the SPF-SFE protocol including this optimization.
Denitions and Preliminaries
Let x ∈ [0, 2 ) be an unsigned -bit integer value and x = (x 1 , .., x ), x i ∈ {0, 1} its corresponding representation as bit vector, i.e., x = i=1 x i 2 i−1 . The length of x is |x| = . We draw a (single) wire with one-bit value as . As usual, multi wire Analogously, a programmable block (PB) is a block consisting of programmable gates or programmable sub-blocks. It is programmed by programming each of its sub-elements. As described before, in SPF-SFE evaluator Alice is unable to extract the program from PB.
Privately Programmable Blocks
In this section we present the concept of Privately Programmable Blocks (PPB) for constructing semi-private functions. Using our ecient PPB constructions given in 5 with the SPF-SFE protocol of 2 allows to preserve the privacy of the function while the protocol remains as ecient as SFE protocol.
Denition 1. A Privately Programmable Block (PPB) is a programmable block which can be programmed to compute any function f of a given class of functions F (e.g., F = {ADD, SU B}) with a corresponding program p f (e.g., f = ADD). We write PPB f for a PPB which is programmed to compute f .
As explained in 2 before, in SPF-SFE the function to be evaluated is composed of several PPBs. Evaluator Alice learns how the PPBs are connected (topology), but the programming of the PPBs remains to be private information of constructor Bob (that's why PPBs are called privately programmable). Alice can infer from the topology of a PPB at most the class of possible functionalities F but not the specic functionality f chosen by Bob. Hence, from Alice's point of view the PPB can compute one functionality from F and the amount of information hidden inside the PPB is log 2 |F| bits. For a semi-private function which is composed from multiple programmable blocks PPB 1 , .., PPB n , the program of each PPB can be combined with any programming of the other PPBs and hence the maximum (as some combinations might not make sense depending on the application) amount of information hidden in the semi-private function is log 2 (|F 1 |·..
Clearly, if this is not large enough (i.e., if the number of PPBs n or number of possible functionalities of PPBs |F i | is small), evaluator Alice might guess the correct function with high probability or probe the system via exhaustive search which must be prohibited by other means.
Universal Circuits (UC) indeed are special PPBs that can be programmed to compute an arbitrary function. U C k is capable of simulating any function corresponding to a circuit with up to k gates with two inputs each. UCs provide full privacy of the evaluated function as the topology is hidden entirely. However, they cause a huge overhead by increasing the size of the evaluated circuit by Simple PPB Construction. A straight-forward implementation of a PPB for a class of n arbitrary functionalities F = {f 1 , f 2 , .., f n } can directly be derived from the denition of PPBs in Denition 1 as shown in Fig. 1(a) . Each functionality f i is computed by a circuit C i and a n : 1 multiplexer (M U X) is programmed to select the intended output. The M U X block can be constructed from v parallel selection blocks S n 1 (as dened in [KS08b]) for each of the v outputs that can be programmed to select any of their n inputs as outputs. If the program p f is known by Bob beforehand it can directly be incorporated into the circuit as described in 8. After optimization, each of the v selection blocks consists of a chain of n − 1 programmable 2-input gates which can be programmed to select either their left or right input as output each [KS08b] . The size of this simple PPB construction is
Ecient PPB Constructions. Ecient PPB constructions can be obtained by choosing special classes of functionalities having circuits with the same (or at least a similar) topology.
This allows to re-use (parts of ) the same circuit C for the dierent functionalities f i as shown ... . For instance, the topology of an adder is the same as that of a subtractor and hence for F = {ADD, SU B} the same topology can be used (cf. 5.3 for a detailed description of this PPB). Based on the intended functionality f ∈ F, the sub-elements of C are programmed dierently while the topology is the same. The size of such an ecient PPB construction is P P B efficient = |C| ≈ |C i | P P B
simple .
When incorporating a private constant c into a PPB, the value of the constant can not be extracted from PPB's topology and hence is hidden from evaluator in the SPF-SFE protocol, e.g., circuits to add/subtract an input with a s-bit constant c have the same topology. To simplify notation, we parametrize the class of possible functionalities with parameter c and write
g., F c = {ADD c , SU B c } in the example given above (cf. 5.4 for a detailed description of this PPB). The amount of information hidden inside a PPB is log 2 |F| = log 2 |F c | + |c| = log 2 (n) + s bits.
(1) Graphical Notation. In the following we use the uniform graphical notation shown in Fig. 2 to specify the interface of PPBs. For a not programmed PPB (Fig. 2(a) ), the lower right corner contains the class F c of functions with which it can be programmed and the upper right corner contains an optional c to denote whether the block also hides a s-bit constant c. A programmed PPB (Fig. 2(b) ) additionally contains the chosen functionality f c in the lower right corner (f c ∈ F c ) and the chosen value κ of the constant c in the upper right corner (c = κ). If the PPB does not hide a constant c, we write f respectively f ∈ F and leave the upper right corner empty. For PPBs that compute arithmetic expressions, the input in is grouped into inputs x and y and the output out is called z. For each PPB we give the Interface specifying the functionality of the block, its number of inputs and outputs, and the dierent possibilities for programming F c . The Implementation describes the topology of the corresponding ecient PPB construction, how to program it, and its size. The inputs are called x, y and the potential private constant is called c, where |x| = m, |y| = n, and |c| = s. To simplify presentation we assume w.l.o.g. m = n, respectively m = s in the following descriptions. The other cases can easily be derived from these by padding the shorter input with zeros and optimizing constant inputs afterwards as described in 8. Recall, evaluator Alice can neither extract the chosen function f c ∈ F c , nor the value of the possibly embedded private constant c ∈ {0, 1} s , from the topology of any PPB. The amount of information hidden inside the PPB is given by equation (1).
The main idea underlying the ecient PPB constructions presented in this paper is to combine functionalities that have structurally equivalent recursive denitions that directly translate into programmable gates of equivalent topologies. For instance, comparison if two m-bit numbers x and y of bitlength m are less or equal is dened recursively as
Whether two numbers are greater or equal is dened recursively as
which is structurally equivalent and hence translates into the same topology (cf. Fig. 3(b) ). (Fig. 3(a) ). PPB COMP implements z = f (x, y) = x y, where ∈ {<, >, = , ≤, ≥, =} and |z| = 1. The corresponding class of functions is F = {L, G, E, LE, GE, N E}. Implementation (Fig. 3(b) ). Topology of PPB COMP consists of a chain of m programmable gates P G i (full comparers) with input bits x i , y i , and carry-in t i−1 and output carry-out t i . The output of PPB COMP is z = t m and the rst carry t 0 = 1 can be directly incorporated into P G 1 . The carry t i propagates whether for the i least signicant bits x <i = x mod 2 i and y <i = y mod 2 i the corresponding relation is fullled (t i = 1) or not (t i = 0). In the following we describe the programming for the cases =, ≤, and ≥; the corresponding cases =, >, and < can be easily derived from this by negating output t m in P G m . In case f = E, P G i is programmed to compute t i = (
PPB:COMP -compare two numbers
. Note, these function table entries correspond exactly to the recursive denitions in equation (2) and (3). This block has size
PPB:
COMPc -compare number with private constant Interface (Fig. 4(a) ). PPB COMPc implements z = f c (x) = x c, where ∈ {<, >, = , ≤, ≥, =}, c is a private constant hidden inside PPB, and |z| = 1. The corresponding class of functions is
Implementation (Fig. 4(b) ). Topology of PPB COMPc is exactly the same as that of PPB COMP described in the previous section, however, each programmable gate P G i has no input for y i which is replaced by the internal constant c i . Also the programming is exactly the same as for PPB COMP with constant c i instead of input y i . This block has size |PPB COMPc | = (m − 1) · 2 2 + 2 1 = 4m − 2.
PPB:ADD/SUB -add or subtract two numbers
Interface ( Fig. 5(a) ). PPB ADD/SUB implements z = f (x, y) = x ± y, where |z| = m + 1.
The class of functions is F = {ADD, SU B}. (Fig. 5(b) ). The topology of PPB ADD/SUB is the well known structure for adders consisting of a chain of m programmable gates P G i (full adders) with inputs carryin t i−1 , x i , y i and outputs carry-out t i , sum z i . The constant t 0 can be directly incorporated into block P G 1 . In case f = ADD, P G i is programmed to compute z i = x i ⊕ y i ⊕ t i−1 and Interface ( Fig. 6(a) ). PPB ADDc/SUBc implements z = f c (x) = x ± c, where c is a private constant hidden inside PPB and |z| = m+1. The class of functions is F c = {ADDc, SU Bc}.
Implementation (Fig. 6(b) ). Topology of PPB ADDc/SUBc is exactly the same as that of PPB ADD/SUB described in the previous section, however, each programmable gate P G i has no input for y i which is replaced by the private constant c i . Also the programming is exactly the same as for PPB ADD/SUB with private constant c i instead of input y i . This block has size PPB ADDc/SUBc = 2 · ((m − 1) · 2 2 + 2 1 ) = 8m − 4.
PPB:MULc -multiply number with private constant
Interface ( Fig. 7(a) ). PPB MULc multiplies input x with private constant c hidden inside PPB, i.e., z = f c (x) = x · c, where |z| = s + m. The class of functions is F c = {M U Lc}. Implementation (Fig. 7(c) ). PPB MULc is implemented according to the school method for multiplication, i.e., adding up the bitwise multiplications of c i and x shifted corresponding to the position:
. This results in the topology shown in Fig. 7 (c), a matrix of s rows and m columns of programmable gates P G i,j (Fig. 7(b) ), where the carry inputs in the rst row and last column are set to zero and built into the corresponding outer gates P G i,j : t 0,j = d i,0 = 0. The programmable gates in each row i have exactly the same topology as an adder (cf. Fig. 5(b) ) that can be programmed to add to the shifted sum of the previous rows
either the value of x in case c i = 1 or zero in case c i = 0, i.e., d i = 2d i−1 + c i · x. Each programmable gate P G i,j is programmed to compute 
Applications
Our general framework and tools for SPF-SFE presented in this paper can be used to specify and implement many privacy-preserving applications. Examples are Blinded Policy Evaluation [FAL04, FLA06, FAL06] In the following we concentrate on privacy-preserving credit checking [FAZ05] which demonstrates how the evaluated function can be partitioned into semi-private and private parts which are both supported by our framework.
Privacy-Preserving Credit Checking. Typically, before granting a loan from a lender (Bob), the credit worthiness of the borrower (Alice) is checked to have the condence that she will be able to pay it back later. The borrower is asked for her credit report that contains a large amount of private information including for example gender, age, income, salary, or other sensitive information like how many trade lines she owns, the number of overdrafts, or the number of late payments. However, revealing this data should be avoided as the lender may not always be a credible organization or, even worse, dishonest employees (so called insiders) could sell such private information on customers to third parties.
Additionally, the evaluation criteria of the lender are highly sensitive information that must be protected as revelation of these may cause loss of intellectually property or loss of repudiation for the lender.
As suggested by Frikken et al. [FAZ05] , this scenario can be reduced to SPF-SFE, where Alice inputs her private credit report and Bob evaluates his semi-private function that checks if the credit report fullls his criteria. To ensure that Alice inputs correct data into the SPF-SFE protocol, the authors describe how to replace the oblivious transfer step by a Credit Report Agency, i.e., a trusted third party, that checks and accredits Alice's inputs instead.
Fig. 9. Example for Privacy-Preserving Credit Checking
Bob's semi-private credit checking function can be expressed in our framework for SPF-SFE as shown in the tiny example of Fig. 9 which is due to space limitations not intended to give the complete solution but merely to show the main concepts. The upper part of the circuit performs some obvious computation on Alice's data, e.g., compare her age with a private constant, or combine this result with her gender. The sensitive information in this part of the function are the private constants, e.g., grant credit only to female persons (gender = 1) that are younger than 65 (age < 65), which are hidden from Alice, whereas the obvious topology can safely be revealed.
The highly sensitive part of the functionality that combines these results depending on the amount of credit requested (credit_req) is hidden entirely from Alice within the universal circuit U C. This PPB can be programmed to compute any functionality computable by a circuit of up to k = 50 gates with arbitrary topology. The specic functionality intended by Bob is the SHDL circuit described in f.shdl, which can automatically be generated from a high-level description in SFDL with the Fairplay compiler.
This example shows how our framework for SPF-SFE can be used to implement an application-specic, reasonable tradeo between eciency while revealing irrelevant information (SPF-SFE with PPBs) and complete function privacy (PF-SFE with UC).
Comparison of SPF-SFE and PF-SFE. Revealing the topology of obvious parts of the functionality while hiding the sensitive parts in a UC results in a smaller circuit as UC overhead can be substantially reduced due to less simulated gates k and less inputs into UC.
This reduced size of the evaluated circuit directly translates into corresponding speedups in any implementation of the underlying SPF-SFE protocol as their performance must be at least linear in the size of the evaluated circuit. Table 1 . Improved UC Overhead in the Example of Fig. 9 As concrete example, Table 1 shows the number of gates that can be saved in the privacypreserving credit checking example of Fig. 9 compared to hiding the functionality entirely in a UC in PF-SFE. For dierent maximum size k (row A) of the part of the functionality which is hidden in UC we give the achieved performance improvements when extracting the obvious part of the functionality into the upper part of the circuit (C OM P c blocks and BOOL block in Fig. 9 ). In our example, these blocks consist of 14 gates, i.e., row B contains the fraction of the functionality which is revealed: 14/(k + 14). Row C shows how many gates are needed to hide the whole functionality of 14 + k gates in a UC with 24 inputs (for credit_req, age, and gender) using the most ecient UC construction of [SS08] which is denoted in parentheses. Row D shows how many gates are needed to implement the UC in our mixed approach as shown in Fig. 9 , where UC has 18 inputs and simulates k gates. The resulting improvements compared to the PF-SFE solution (row E) supersede the fraction of the gates extracted (row B) as the number of inputs into UC is also reduced.
Optimization of Circuits with Constant Inputs
We describe a general optimization algorithm that incorporates constant inputs into a block (sub-circuit) B. The topology of the resulting optimized block B opt is independent of the values of the constant inputs and its number of inputs and size are smaller, i.e., the number of gates respectively their degree is reduced as shown in Fig. 10 . Besides the well known propagation of constant inputs (step 1), our algorithm additionally eliminates resulting gates with one input by incorporating them into surrounding gates (steps 2 and 3), which results in a smaller circuit size. The optimization algorithm is a non-cryptographic transformation of circuits and hence of independent interest. As outlined in 2, one possible application is to use this optimization to improve Yao's protocol. In this application, constant inputs might be public constant values known to both parties as well as the private inputs of (semi-honest) circuit constructor Bob (if known at the time of construction of the garbled circuit).
Terminology. The following terminology is visualized in Fig. 10(a) . Assume the gates G i , i = 1, .., n of a block B are numbered in topological order, i.e., gate G i has no inputs that are outputs of gates with larger index G j>i . Otherwise, this order can be obtained eciently via topological sorting in O(n).
An output gate is a gate whose output is also an output of B. Similarly, an input gate is a gate, which has at least one input that is also an input of B. For gate G i , pred(G i ) denotes the set of its predecessors, i.e., gates whose output is an input into G i . Analogously, succ(G i ) denotes the set of G i 's successors, i.e., gates having the output of G i as input. The fan-out of a gate G i is the number of its successors, i.e., f anout(G i ) = #succ(G i ). 
as k s -th input. If constant gate G i is not an output gate it is eliminated afterwards. In the running example of Fig. 10 , constant input in 3 is input into gate G 1 whose size is reduced by half when eliminating the second input (k 1 = 2). The resulting gate G 1 has one non-constant input in 2 and hence no further optimization is performed. The other constant input in 7 is input into G 3 which is optimized into a constant gate G 3 by eliminating the constant input. Hence, eliminateConstInput() is called recursively for successor G 5 and G 3 is eliminated. Similarly to G 3 , gate G 5 is also reduced to a constant gate G 5 and eliminateConstInput() is called for successor G 7 which eliminates its second input. As the output of G 5 is also output of B it is not eliminated and remains as constant gate G d .
After the optimizations in Step 1, there might be gates G i with only one input. The next two steps of Algorithm 1 try to remove these gates by replacing them with wires and incorporating their functionalities into their successors (
Step 2) or predecessors (Step 3).
Step 2 -Eliminate non-output gates with one input. The second step of Algorithm 1 eliminates non-output gates with d = 1. The functionality of each one-input gate G i which is not an output gate is incorporated into its successors G s ∈ succ(G i ) by the function integrateInSucc(G i ). This function eliminates G i by replacing it with a wire and incorporating the functionality of g i into the function tables of all its successors G s ∈ succ(G i ): Let the output of G i be the k-th input of G s and d the degree of G s . Then, the modied gate
Note that, independent of the functionality g i , the resulting gate G s has the same size as G s but additionally incorporates the functionality of g i while not revealing any additional information on it. As in Step 1, the function tables of gates are not directly modied but rst all needed modications are marked and then done simultaneously to get runtime in O(|G i |) per gate. In the running example of Fig. 10, Step 2 eliminates G 1 by replacing it with a wire and modifying the function table of G 6 correspondingly. Analogously, gate G 7 which only has one input from G 2 left after the optimizations performed in Step 1 is replaced by a wire. The function tables of its successors G 9 → G b and G 10 → G c are modied correspondingly.
Step 3 -Eliminate output gates with one input. The third step of Algorithm 1 tries to eliminate output gates with d = 1. The functionality of each output gate G i with one input is incorporated into its predecessor G p . This is only possible if G i is the only successor of G p , i.e., f anout(G p ) = 1. In this case, function integrateInPred(G i ,G p ) is called which eliminates gate G i by replacing it with a wire and incorporates its functionality into gate
Step 2, this optimization step is independent of the functionality g i and the resulting gate G p has the same size as G p but additionally incorporates the functionality of g i while not revealing any additional information on it.
In the running example of Fig. 10, Step 3 eliminates G 8 by replacing it with a wire and modifying the function table of G 6 → G a correspondingly. In contrast to this, gate G c cannot be incorporated into its predecessor G 2 as G c is not its only successor (f anout(G 2 ) = 2). The optimized block B opt produced by Algorithm 1 is shown in Fig. 10(b) . It has size |B opt | = 21 which is less than 62% of the size of the original block |B| = 34. Step 2 also needs at most O(|B|) operations for elimination of gate G i , marking and incorporating the functionality of G i into the succeeding gates and analogously Step 3 runs in O(|B|) as well. Hence, the overall runtime of Algorithm 1 is in O(|B|).
3. All constant inputs that are not outputs are eliminated:
Step 1 of Algorithm 1 eliminates all constant inputs that are not outputs of B by incorporating them into the input gates G i in eliminateConstInput().
4. Size is reduced: As c > 0 there is at least one constant input which is not output of B and therefore must be input of at least one gate G (otherwise the circuit would not be connected). The size of G is reduced by eliminateConstInput() in Step 1. As all other optimizations never increase the size of the block its size is strictly reduced: |B opt | |B|. Only the contents of the modied function tables depend on the values v j . Hence, the resulting topology of the optimized block B opt does not depend on the values v j and therefore B opt does not reveal anything about v j .
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Conclusion
Exploiting Yao's protocol to additionally hide parts of the evaluated function f as described in this paper is as ecient as Yao's plain SFE protocol. Hence, SPF-SFE is much more ecient than PF-SFE whose practicability is restricted (due to large overhead caused by UC). In many practical applications full hiding of f is not necessary at all as shown in 7:
Obvious parts of the topology can safely be revealed while the sensitive parts are still hidden in a (much smaller) UC.
Our FairplaySPF compiler extends the well-known Fairplay SFE framework [MNPS04] with capabilities to easily describe semi-private functions with our new Secure Programmable Block Description Language SPBDL, compile and optimize them into circuits which can efciently be evaluated with an SPF-SFE protocol based on Yao's protocol.
In principle, the ideas of SPF-SFE using PPBs can be extended to malicious, respectively covert constructor Bob as well by using SFE protocols that apply cut-and-choose technique (Fig. 11(n) ). Topology of PPB BOOL is a chain of u − 1 programmable gates P G i , i = 1, .., u − 1 with input bits in i+1 , carry-in t i−1 , and output t i . The output of PPB BOOL is out = t u−1 and the rst carry-in is t 0 = in 1 . The carry t i contains the intermediate result from combining the lower i + 1 input bits in <i+1 = in mod 2 i+1 with the corresponding operation. In the following we describe the programming for the cases AN D, OR, and XOR; the corresponding cases N AN D, N OR, and XN OR can be easily derived from this by negating output t u−1 in P G u−1 . In case f = AN D, P G i is programmed to compute an AND gate t i = in i+1 ∧t i−1 . The cases f = OR and f = XOR are constructed analogously. This block has size |PPB BOOL | = (u − 1) · 2 2 = 4u − 4.
B.2 PPB:BOOLc -boolean combination of input and private constant Interface ( Fig. 12(a) ). Implementation (Fig. 12(b) ). Topology of PPB BOOLc consists of u programmable gates P G i in parallel with input bit in i and output out i that combine the corresponding input bit in i and the private constant c i . In case f c = AN D c , P G i is programmed to compute out i = in i ∧ c i . The other cases are similar. This block has size |PPB BOOLc | = u · 2 1 = 2u.
